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IN THE SUPREME COunT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEERY AND HILTON TRAVEL
SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
No. 15219

vs.
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL
AIRWAYS, INC.,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent and cross-appellant, Capitol International Airways,
Inc. (Capitol), is a charter airline. Appellant, DeEry and Hilton Travel
Services, Inc. (DeEry) is a travel agent.

This case arose when Capitol

refused to fly a charter aircraft for DeEry due to the lack of an enforceable contract and DeEry's non-performance of conditions precedent to
the contract.

DeEry sued Capitol for breach of contract and unjust

discrimination against DeEry.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COunT
Following a jury trial and pursuant to the special written inter~ccgatories

submitted to the jury, the court, The Honorable Maurice

ddrd:ng
JUdgment
for provided
DeEry
and
against
Sponsoredpresiding,
by the S.J. Quinneyentered
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
by the
Institute
of Museum Capitol
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the sum of $8, 170. 00 plus interest.

Thereafter the court denied

the motions of the respective parties for directed verdicts in their favor
and for a new trial and additur.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Capitol seeks an order from this court directing the trial court
to enter a directed verdict in favor of Capitol, holding there was no
contract.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is the intention of respondent and cross-appellant,

Capitol, to

supply the court here with an overview of the facts and make reference to
specific facts within the arguments.

Appellant, DeEry, is a travel agem

involved in the sale of travel, transportation and vacation services to the
general public, with its principal place of business in the'State of Utah.
Capitol is a supplemental air carrier, sometimes known as a charter
airlbe, with its principal place of business in the State of Tennessee.
There is no dispute that Capitol and DeEry, prior to November

c:

1973, engaged in numerous transactions whereby DeEry would charter
the aircraft of Capitol for specific flights flown from specific points aroVthe world.
In early November, 1973, DeEry contacted representatives of
Capitol to inquire concerning the price and arrangements which could be.,
to fly three flights, which were subsequently assigned the numbers of
485 and 486.

Pursuant to this inquiry, lning H. ''Buck" l\lansfield, a

representative of Capitol, under co,·er rlf his letter of ::\o•:ember ~~. '

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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c),,

sent three contract forms to DeEry for the above-mentioned flights.

With

his letter of November 30, 1973, DeEry returned the contract forms for
Flight 485, having signed them on the designated line. Thereafter an
addendum to all contracts was sent to all customers of Capitol providing
for a 15 percent increase in prices, which was approved by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, due to the Arab oil embargo which caused a sharp
increase in fuel prices.

DeEry executed an addendum for earlier flights

he had contracted for but did not return an addendum for Flight 485.

Also,

the addendum submitted by DeEry contained a specific reservation of rights
to challenge the price increase.
On December 20, 1973, Buck Mansfield, the regional vice-president
for Capitol, wrote to Carl Topham, counsel for Capitol. This letter was
designed to acquaint legal counsel with information relating to litigation
that had been instituted by DeEry against Capitol on other transactions
involving the parties, which included a challenge as to the legality of the
above-mentioned price increases.

In response to this letter, Topham

replied to lvlansfield in his letter of January 24, expressing concern over
DeEry's non-compliance with CAB regulations. Several letters from
DeEry followed, asking Capitol to sign the contracts for Flight 485.
Capitol never did sign he contracts or otherwise enter into an agreement
as to that particular flight with DeEry.
In July of 1974, DeEry brought a declaratory action for a
declaration of rights under the alleged contract resulting in the instant
~chon

for damages being brought by DeEry.

Notwithstanding the fact
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that DeEry acknowledged contract problems, it was not until November
2, 1974, 20 days before the planned departure, that DeEry sent a letter
to Pan American Airlines to see if they would be willing to charter an
airplane for the tour.

On November 8, 1974, Pan Am rejected the idea

and refused to fly a plane for DeEry.

Thereafter DeEry purchased indhc

tickets on Air Canada and took the tour particpants to Canada for departuc'

The total price of these individual tickets far exceeded the cost of a
charter tour flight.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN DEERY AND CAPITOL
DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF A CONTRACT FOR
THE CHARTER OF FLIGHT 485.
A. Capitol is restricted in its acceptance powers of offers to contract
by the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The first question this court must decide is whether a contract
form sent by a supplemental air carrier to a tour operator with a cover
letter explaining contingencies which must be satisfied in order to resuh
in a binding contract may be construed as an absolute and binding offer

by the air carrier.

By letter of November 27, 1973, DeEry received

contract forms referred to as such in the cover letter from Capitol.
(Tr. Day 2, p. 44). It was also pointed out to DeEry in that same cover
letter that his Civil Aeronautics Board filing must be received immedi 111
or the 11ights would be cancelled.

(Tr. Day 2, p. 108). It was wah

reason that Mr. Mansfield, the representati'.e for Capitol, put tlneo
warning for DeEry into the cover letter. The ·.·ery first conditlon oi

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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contract itself is:
1. This contract is subject to the terms, conditions,
rules, regulations, rates and charges in United States
dollars, contained in applicable tariffs of the carrier on
file with the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United
States in effect on the date of the initial flight departure;
to the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
as amended; to the terms, conditions, limitations, rules
and regulations set forth in applicable governmental
laws or regulations; and to such U.S. and foreign
governmental or other approval as may be required.

The relevant and applicable regulations of the CAB which deal
with the formation of such charter contracts are found in Section 208. 31A and
B, which states as follows:

208. 31A. Written agreements with ticket agents. Each
agreement between a supplemental air carrier and any
ticket or cargo agent shall be reduced to writing and
signed by all parties thereto, if it relates to any of the
following subjects:
(a) The furnishings of persons or property for
transportation;
(b) The arranging for flights for the accommodation
of persons or property;
(c) The solicitation or generation of passenger
or cargo traffic to be transported;
(d) The charter or lease of aircraft.
208. 31B.

Written contract with charterers.

(a) Every agreement to perform a charter trip,
except charters for the Department of Defense, shall
be in writing and signed by an authorized representative
of the supplemental air carrier and the charterer prior
to operation of the charter flight; provided that where
execution of a contract prior to commencement of flight
is impracticable because the charter has been arranged
on short notice, compliance with the provision hereof
shall be effected within seven (7) days after commencement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of the flight. The written agreement shall include
without limitation:
( 1) Date and place of execution of the contract
or agreement;
(2) Signature, printed or typed, name of each
signatory, and official provision of each;
(3) Dates of flights and points involved;
(4) Type and capacity of aircraft; number of
passenger seats available or pounds of cargo capacity;
and
(5) Rates, fares, and charges applicable to
the charter trip, including the charter price, live and ferry
mileage charges, and layover and other non-flight charges.
(6) The name and address of either the surety
whose bond secures advance charter payments received
by the carrier or of the carrier's depository bank to
which checks or money orders for advance charter payments are to be made payable, as escrow holder pending
completion of the charter trip; and
(7) A statement that unless the charterer files
a claim with the carrier, or, if he is unavailable, with
the surety within sixty (60) days after the cancellation
of a charter trip with respect to which the charterer's
advance payments are secured by the bond, the surety
shall be released from all liability under the bond to such
charterer for such charter trip.
(b) No term or condition of the charter contract
shall on its face be inconsistent with any provision of
the carrier's published tariff.
For the type of student charter which DeEry proposed to !1y, a
joint filing between the air carrier and the tour operator must be pro•.c,,i,
to the C.\B under Regulation 378. 10.
In light of these regulations

req·~iring

the signJ.turc:s of bot:c

parties in writing, on the contract, and requinng a .io;.;ct filing, bec··.;:·c
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this contract could become binding upon both parties, not only was DeEry
required to sign the contract form, but also Capitol.

Capitol, as a

supplemental air carrier, is involved in an industry which may be more
highly regulated by the federal government than any other.

They were

aware of the CAB regulations when negotiating with DeEry and could not
violate those provisions. Therefore, the entire contract, as may be seen
above, is contingent upon satisfying the conditions in the CAB regulations
and in the contract.

In this matter, Capitol reserved the right to refuse

to contract with anyone not in compliance with the CAB regulations.
Although no cases directly on point have been found, a similar
fact situation was involved in North Denver Bank v. Bell, 528 P. 2d 413
(Colo. 1974).

In this case an agreement was entered into by the parties

whereby a loan commitment was made for a period of 18 months.

By way of

letters, seven conditions were stipulated which were to be met or agreed
tu, either prior to or simultaneous to the closing of a loan.

The court held

that it was clear from the language of the commitment letter that the list
of requirements was intended to be conditions precedent to the other party's
obligation to perform.

The court stated:

Fairways did not offer to provide the signatures of the
owners of the construction company as principals on
the note to be executed at the closing and should not
provide ire lien protection required by the commitment
letter. Failure to fulfill any one of the conditions would
have been sufficient grounds for Capital Federal's
refusal to make the loan. 528 P. 2d at 414.
It ts the law in Utah that an unconditional acceptance of an offer
""rms a binding contract.

R. J. Daum Construction Co. v. Childs, 122 Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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194, 247 P. 2d 817 (1952).

Because Capitol is governed by the CAB and,

therefore, conditions its acceptance of contracts upon compliance with

c_

regulations, there was no unconditional acceptance to form a binding cue:
with DeEry.

Capitol refused to sign the contract due to the lack of fuHr:>

ment of the conditions cited above, and rightly so, in order to a void
violation of the CAB regulations.
B.

DeEry was aware of the contract conditions and the CAB regulations
but did not comply.
The importance of the proposed filing for student tour charters

cannot be over-emphasized.

The filing is a joint filing, as required by

CAB Regulation 378. 10, which provides as follows:
Procedure. (a) No inclusive tour or series of tours
shall be operated, nor shall any tour operator or
foreign tour operator sell, or offer to sell, or
solicit persons to participate in, or otherwise
advertise such tour or tours, or receive any money
from any prospective participant in connection therewith, until at least fifteen days after he and the direct
air carrier have jointly filed with the Board (Supplementary Services Division, Bureau of Operating
Rights), in duplicate a tour prospectus, satisfying
the requirements of Section 378. 13. [Emphasis added]
Section 378. 13 of the CAB regulations details the information ar.c
materials which comprise the tour prospectus:
The prospectus shall be filed in duplicate and shall
include two copies of the following: The charter
contract, the contract between the tour operator or
foreign tour operator and tour participants, the tour
operator's . . . surety bond . . . , and, where
applicable, two copies of the depository agreement
with a bank . . .
Other requirerEents set forth are as :·ollo'.'IS:

The tour uptr2'• ,

nameby the
and
address;
the Funding
proposed
date
andby time
oiof each
r1Ight:
the r:.pc,
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization
provided
the Institute
Museum and
Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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number and capacity of aircrafts; the tour itinerary (including hotel names
and sightseeing arrangements); the tour price per passenger, the number
of tour participants; the aircraft charter price; the individually ticketed
air fare; and samples of the tour operator's proposed solicitation materials .
.c\11 such materials must state the direct air carrier's name and it should be
noted that the documents and information which make up the tour prospectus
are readily available to the tour operator from his own records or otherwise.
There can be no doubt that DeEry acknowledged the conditions in
the contract and the CAB regulations. In his reply letter to Buck Mansfield

of November 30, 1973, DeEry states:

"I am now printing the solicitation

material for the student flights, which I will send to you in the next few
days, as well as the first draft of the ITC filing. " (Exhibit 4- P, Tr. Day
1, p. 48).

DeEry does not contend that Capitol prevented him from making this
mandatory filing.

Even if Capitol's "failure" to execute the charter

agreement was improper and prevented filing of the assigned charter
contract, DeEry still could have substantially complied with Section
378. 13.

DeEry made no attempt to do so.
As has already been pointed out in the CAB regulations, DeEry

cannot contend that it was not bound by the regulations, as a tour operator
is specifically labeled as an indirect air carrier.

Also, no contention

can be made that Capitol is not governed by said regulations.

One tour

uperatur has been prosecuted for non-compliance with the same regulations
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in the Federal District Court for the District of Utah. CAB v. Internatw

··:.:.1

Exchange School, Dist. of Utah, 1973, 357 F. Supp. 819.
CAB

proceedin~

For an analogo,,•'

see In Re Matterhorn Travel Service, Inc., CAB Ordt'_

Cease and Desist, (May 1975, Order 75-5-3), Docket 27797.

In the

Matterhorn enforcement proceeding, the CAB found that Matterhorn was
an inclusive tour operator and thereby an indirect air carrier under
Section 101. 3 of the Federal Aviation Act (49 USC, Section 1301, sub 3).
This subjected Matterhorn to the provisions of Part 378 of the regulations,

prohibiting a tour operator from selling, soliciting or advertising a tour:.
15 days after a satisfactory tour prospectus has been filed. The CAB impcs·
a civil penalty of $1, 000. 00 against Matterhorn in this proceeding. In

si:;~

I

DeEry knew of the conditions of the contract and of the CAB regulations;:
did not perform the conditions and openly violated the regulations.
C.

As a matter of law, it was not the intent of the parties to form a
binding contract in this instance.
It doesn't matter that the form of a piece of paper is called a

''contract", the IP verning consideration in determining the existence
of such an instrument is always the intent of the parties.

It is the

contention of Capitol that upon the evidence presented to the court below,
Capitol was entitled to a verdict as a matter of law that the parties had ..:
intention of being bound by the written agreement signed by DeEry.
A brief sketch of the parties' correspondence, which was exhibi~'
to the jury, will reveal to the court the obvious intent and understa!'d;:;£
of the parties.

On l'lovember 8, 1973, DeEry wrote to Buck :\Iansfield

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

1

requesting "charter bids" for two flights.

(Exhibit 1- P). This was followed

by a telephone call from DeEry's secretary requesting the flights and price
information.

(Tr. Day 1, p.

42, 43).

The response to DeEry's request was Capitol's letter of November
27, 1973.

(Exhibit 2-P). Contract forms were enclosed therein for the desired

flights, with instructions in the cover letter that the forms must be returned
unmediately, the price was subject to increase, and the ITC filing must
be received by Capitol immediately or the flights would be cancelled.

There

is no question that DeEry returned the forms signed, but Capitol never
signed as accepting the contract.

The contract form itself (Exhibit 3-P),

reveals an obvious intent on the part of Capitol to reserve the power to
accept.

At the time the forms were sent to DeEry, no signature was placed

in the appropriate space as "accepted for Capitol".

If they had ir.tended to

be bound by this contract, it seems that they would have signed it ahead of
time.

As a matter of law, DeEry knew of the conditions that Capitol had
placed on the contract forms and the cover letter. Upon reading DeEry's
reply letter which enclosed the signed contract forms (Exhibit 4- P), one
rationally must come to the conclusion that at that time DeEry must have
known of the conditional nature of the "contract".

He states therein:

I am now printing the solicitation material for the
student flights, which I will send to you in the next few
days as well as the first draft of the ITC filing.
I did not file earlier because I did not want to make
this exciting new concept public until the time was
right. [Emphasis added]
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Thus, DeEry knew of the conditions in the contract, needed no ot:;
information to make a first draft of the ITC fJ.ing, and only waited
of his own preference.

beca~:'

Further, it appears in that same letter that he :1,,

not at that time begun any type of solicitation. Capitol believes this goes
to show the tentative nature of the so- called "contract" and the concerr.s
of the respective parties.
Following this, on December 5, 1973, Capitol sent to DeEry an
addendum for all charter commitments, raising the price due to th2 o1l
embargo, and for which it was necessary to return to Capitol within two
weeks or all flights were cancelled.

(Exhibit 5- P). DeEry filled out

me

addendum for all other flights it had scheduled, but left out Flight 485,
the one this lawsuit is based on.

The obvious inference from this, prope:

drawn by Capitol, was that DeEry no longer desired these flights.

Capit:

contends this again displays DeEry's wavering intent to make a formal
"contract".
DeEry contends that it requested information from Capitol that
was never supplied which was necessary for the ITC filing on Flight 48.;,
(Tr. Day 2, p. 3). The correspondence on January 4, 1974, (Exhibit 9-f'
can only be characterized as less than crystal clear.

-~ttached therein

were sample copies of promotional literature and a request for forms
and instructions for an ITC filing. G'o reference was r.1ade to the fligtts
for which this was necessary.

Capitol was not in the practice of

ITC filing forms to DeEry, and DeEry had earlier sta~ed it would se:c,
first draft of the ITC fili.'1g for Flighc 435 co Capitol wnh the o•·l
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:naterials.

Now DeBry complains that since Capitol did not send forms,

it could not file. This can in no way be characterized as a prever.tion of

performance by Capitol. DeBry was certainly capable of obtaining that
information from the CAB itself.
On January 29, 1974, DeBry wrote to Capitol and exhibited a possible
change of intent with regard to Charter Flight No. 485.

(Exhibit 11-P).

Of course, by this time DeBry had instituted lawsuits against Capitol on
other matters, and Capitol was reluctant to comply with his "reasonable
requests".

DeBry made several other inquiries with regard to this, all

evidencing the fact of the tentative nature of the arrangement thus far and
his own anxiety in firming up the plans.

(Tr. Day 2, p. 9 and 11).

In further exhibition of his uncertainty, DeBry resorted to a
declaratory action in July of 1974, which was unsuccessful, but resulted
in 1he present action.

(Tr. Day 2, p. 18). Even though claiming there

was a contract, DeBry requested a return of his deposit for Flight No.
485 on May 1, 1974.

(Exhibit 14-P). At that point it seems clear that

anyone capable of digesting this complicated set of facts, would realize
there was no contract.

The consideration for the so-called "contract"

was very tentative in nature at best and now being withdrawn, there could
be no contract between the parties.
In addition to all of this, DeBry admits that the departure gate for
Flight No. 485 was tentative.

Accordingly, the price of the charter flight

·'OIUd change substantially, and the flight may not even meet his demand
:ntd '>-et, UeBry contends there was a contract.

(Tr. Day 3, p. 63).
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Most of that evidence presented herein was given by DeEry hiD.s: __ '
at trial. The information testified to by Buck Mansfield only strengthens
the conclusion that the nature of their relationship was very tentative a":
there was no intent on the part of Capitol or DeEry to be bound absolute>.
by sending to DeEry an unsigned, incomplete contract form.

Cpon that

evidence, the trial judge should have granted Capitol's motion for a
directed verdict as a matter of law, the evidence clearly showing that be
intent of the parties did not give rise to a contract.
In a recent Utah case, a similar question arose concerning wher.
a written contract becomes binding upon a party.

In Aspen Acres

Association v. Seven Associates, 29 Utah 2d 303, 408 F. 2d 1179 (19731,:
plaintiff attempted to enforce a written contract with the defendant whtch
required the defendant to convey easements to the plaintiff.

The evidence

adduced at trial indicated that the contract was signed by the represernL
of the parties but never delivered to plaintiff by defendant.

In holding the

the contract was not binding, even though signed by both parties, this
court stated:
. . . The mere affi.xing of the signatures to the contract
did not conclusively prove that there was a binding
contract. In addition, there must be a delivery, not
in the traditional sense of the manual transfer ~
the sense that it was the intent of the parties to have
the document become legally operative at some
definite point in time, however, such intent might be
indicated. 29 Utah 2d at 311.
_-\gain, in reviewing the facts, the court must keep in mtnd t;ca;
both of the parties involved were faoiliar w:th the Cc\B regdatwrs
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govern this transaction.

The court must asswne that the parties intended

to act in accordance with these regulations which concern the contracts
in question.
Pursuant to the above, Capitol requests that this court reverse
the decision below and order a directed verdict in favor of Capitol.

There

is no mistaking that the intent of the parties was not sufficient to give rise
to a contract.
POINT II.
DEERY BREACHED THE CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THE
CONTRACT FORl\II, THEREBY EXCUSING ANY PERFORiviANCE
BY CAPITOL.
Asswning the court overcomes the enormous hurdles set forth in
Point I and finds a contract, the question must still be asked whether
performance may be required of a party to a contract where the demanding
party has not performed essential conditions to that contract. As set forth
in Point I, the contract was conditioned upon DeEry qualifying under the
CAB regulations, and this was not done.

Before liability can arise upon a promise qualified by express
conditions, the conditions must be fulfilled.
Contracts, Section 3 61.

See 17 Am. Jur. 2d,

Therefore, if DeEry failed to provide the

requested docwnents, Capitol would be relieved from the obligations
'lnder the contract to perform.

See Restatement of Contracts, Section

l3o, and also Ross v. Harding, 64 vVash. 2d 231, 391 P. 2d 526 (1964).
it is not sufficient for the defaulting party to say that the condition will

'<•crk a hardship upon him.

In Ephraim Theater v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163,
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321 P. 2d 221 (1958), this court declared that neither the courts nor :he
parties can ignore or modify the conditions expressed in a contract mere;
because it will work a hardship upon a party.

Again, the North Demer

Bank case, Supra, would be relevant, wherein it was stated:
Failure to fulfill any one of the conditions would have
been sufficient grounds for Capital Federal's refusal
to make the loan. 528 P.2d at 414.
In reviewing the contract it will be seen that the reverse side
contains various requirements labeled as conditions. When viewed in
light of the CAB regulations, it is easy to see why there was concern
on the part of Buck Mansfield about the sales materials and the proposed
prospectus for filing.

Mansfield was obviously concerned about this,

and DeBry, as set out in Point I, was obviously aware and understood
these regulations.

DeBry did not comply with the regulations or the

conditions of the contract even if a contract arose at the time DeEry sign:
Capitol is, therefore, excused from performance, and this court should
reverse the decree below and order a directed verdict in favor of Capite:.
POINT III.
DEBRY FAILED TO PROPERLY MITIGATE DAMAGES AND,
THEREFORE, IVLi\Y NOT RECOVER FOR ANY EXCESS
EXPENSE HE MAY HAVE JNClJRRED IN ORDER TO CARRY
OUT HIS TOUR.
If the court finds a contract and finds that Capitol had a duty to

fly Charter Flight No. 485, the question must still be answered whether
one party can ignore an obvious rejection of the agreement and incur
unreasonable expenses instead of looking !'or alternatives to perior:::"J~.'
of the contract.
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The fundamental "rule of avoidable consequences'' imposes the
duty to minimize damages on the aggrieved party to a breached contract.
25 CJS, Damages, Section 32 at 697.

Utah follows the rule that a"plaintiff

has a duty reasonably to mitigate damages".
Utah 2d 359, 463 P. 2d 801, 802 (1970).

Thompson v. Jacobsen, 23

Utah has further held that a "seller

must minimize or keep down his damages so far as it is reasonably within
his power to do so." Nasner v. Burton, 2 Utah 2d 236, 272 P. 2d 163, 166
(1954).

Utah, consequently, permits a plaintiff to recover "only such damages

as he could not, with reasonable effort, have avoided".
Company, 88 Utah 325,

Jankele v. Texas

54 P.2d 425 (1936). The general rule, therefore,

is to forbid recovery for he resultant excess damages.

See also Sheffet

v. Los Angeles County, 84 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Cal. App. 1970); Hunter v.

Croysdill, 169 Cal. App. 2d 307, 337 P. 2d 174 (1959); Murphy v. Kelly,
137 Cal. App. 2d 21, 289 P. 2d 565 (1955).

The long established principles cited above were summarized in
Winans v. Sierra Lumber Company, 66 Cal. 61, 4 P. 952 (1884):
The law imposes upon everyone engaged in the performance
of a contract the duty of doing everything in his power to
prevent loss to himself from a breach of the contract
by the other party. If he cannot prevent it altogether,
he must make reasonable exertions to render it as light
as possible; and if, by his own negligence or wilfulness
he allows the damages to be unncessarily enhanced,
the increased loss must fall on him. [Emphasis added]
This language draws heavily on the treatise, Sutherland on Damages
13ct Ed.), Yolume 1, Section 88.

Sutherland's language is approvingly

quoted in :Vlolrb v. Stewart, 147 Cal. 413, 81 P. 1073 (1905).
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It is, the ref ore, required that as soon as the aggrieved party lee;:,

that the other party has stopped performance of an executory contract,
that party "cannot continue to perform and recover damages based on
full performance." Schmidt v. New Plastic Corporation, 144 Cal. .-'l.pp.
2d Supp. 849, 301 P. 2d 131 (1956).

Thus:

The rule is well settled that it is the duty of one
who knows he is threatened with damages to do all
he reasonably can do to minimize his damage.
California Cotton Cooperative Association v. Byrne, 58 Cal. App.
2d 340, 345, 136 P. 2d 359 (1943).
Utah follows this rule: As soon as one party realizes that the

ot~e:

party will not perform a contractual condition, the aggrieved party need

1

not "uselessly abide time" but ought, under appropriate circumstances, •:'
mitigate its damages.

University Club v. Invesco Holding Company, 29

Utah 21, 504 P. 2d 29, 30 (1972).

Here DeEry unreasonably stood by ano

idly watched its claimed damages escalate long after it became obvious
that Flight 485 was not going to be operated by Capitol.
Many months previous to the day of departure, DeEry should
certainly have known that there were problems with the contract and that
he should make efforts to mitigate the possible damages.

As early as

May of 1974, DeEry revoked his previous instructions regarding the
$1, 000. 00 deposit and must have known at that time that such an action
removed the consideration for the contract.

~lr.

DeEry, the chair:nar

of the board of DeEry Hilton Company, was a:1 attorney and was respc.''
for carrying out fuese negotianons and, thereiore, should be 11eld •c,"
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higher standard than those persons knowing very little about the law.

He

knew that Capitol had not responded to inquiries about the contract and his
frequent inquiries certainly are a signal that he was distressed about the
status and recognized that there were real problems.

Also, DeEry failed

to comply with the conditions of the contract, and the law should presume
that a party to a contract should know whether or not it is in compliance
with the terms of that contract.

Although DeEry claims that it needed

information from Capitol to make an ITC filing, when DeEry later attempted
to make other arrangements for the flights, DeEry was able to submit a
complete tour prospectus to Pan American Airlines on very little notice.
(Tr. Day 2, p. 61).

In July of 1974, DeEry instituted a declaratory action against
Capitol expressing at that time the fear that Capitol was not going to
honor the contract.

That resulted in the instant litigation, but DeEry at

that time should have known that Capitol was not going to perform.

Clearly,

if the parties were at that point coming to blows in a courtroom, that
constitutes reasonable notice to each that a contract dispute has arisen.
At that point DeEry had an absolute duty to mitigate his damages.

Although DeEry claims that in July he made a list of air carriers
and submitted this list to his secretary to find an alternate carrier, no
list was produced in court, and his secretary was not produced to verify
his statement.

(Tr. Day 2, p. 58).

The only airli.'1e contacted by written

communication from DeEry was Pan Am on November 2.

Indeed,

2.ck:Jowledging the fact that the carrier and the tour operator must make a
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joint ITC filing, the documentation attached to the letter to Pan Am con,"
(1) a prospectus; (2) a surety bond; (3) the filing fee; (4) the charter agr:c
ment; (5) the sample solicitation material.
been unable to do for Capitol.

All of this DeEry claims to:""

(Tr. Day 2, p. 61). In other words, DeB:

did nothing to find alternative air carrier service until it was much too:,
and then submitted to the potential air carrier all of the information that
was required by Capitol to comply with the terms of its contract.
In addition, no solicitation for actual sale began for the flight um;"
September of 1974.

Until that time, DeEry did not know whether there

would actually be a flight or not.

(Tr. Day 2, p. 46 and 47). The way

DeEry's operation typically worked, a flight would be chartered, market::.
of tickets would then be attempted, and if insufficient sales resulted, the
flight would be cancelled. Capitol believes the obvious inference from aL
of this is that DeEry did not know whether he would actually need another
flight and, therefore, did not attempt to contact ot.'"ler air carriers. Had
DeEry acted reasonably, it would have known that Capitol would not
provide the air service and that the best way to mitigate its damages at
that point was to either cancel the tour altogether or find alternative me<.:o
for providing air service.
It is interesting to note that DeEry claims to have been unable to

find other air carrier service when with little effort Capitol was able t2
find air carrier service available up until the first week iil October of
1974, with Saturn Airways at a much more reasonable price than t.'1at
paid by DeEry.

(Tr. Day,!, p. 11)"

-~lso,

:\lr. Ralph Sacks, a

repr:s~
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I

of Saturn, testified to the fact that the period of time which DeEry was

requesting air service was actually a slack period and there would likely have
been other air carriers open to provide service on the dates needed.

(Tr.

Day 4, p. 4). The resulting difference between the price of air service
by Capitol and that which could have been provided by Saturn was the amount
of the JUry verdict in the instant case, $8, 170. 00.

Capitol contends that

even this verdict was excessive.
As discussed above, DeEry should have known that performance
of the contract was not likely under the circumstances.

This knowledge

occurred many months before actual breach of the contract, therefore
allowing DeEry ample time to mitigate its damages. DeEry did not make
a reasonable effort to mitigate damages and, in fact, made very little
effort at all. The obvious reason for this lack of effort was the fact that
it was uncertain until the latter part of September of 1974, whether or not
a flight would even be needed. Because of this method of operation, DeEry
was unable to mitigate its damages and now asks the court to compel
Capitol to pay for these errors in judgment.

Also, DeEry failed to respond

to the conditions of the contract but regardless of this, wants someone
else to pay for this mistake.
Capitol asks this court to reverse the damage award of the court
below and order judgment in favor of Capitol
POINT IV.
NO _--\TTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED.
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DeEry correctly cites the "American Rule" that a prevailing pw· i
is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees except where permitted by
contract or by statute.

Capitol agrees with the conclusion in the case o:

Alyeska Pipe Line Service Co. v. Wilderness Societv, 421 G. S. 240, ";
L. Ed. 2d 141, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975\ as cited by DeEry.

However, DeBr.

has misconstrued the use of the "bad faith'' exception in allowing attorne:..
fees.

In examining DeEry's own cited authorities, in the case

of~

Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 186 F. 2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951), there was ar.
action brought by Negro locomotive firemen against their employer and
their collective bargaining agent.
conduct.

The suit was brought for

discri...'llinato~

The court sustained the taxation of attorney's fees in favor of

the prevailing party in this case, first because it was a suit in equity ar.c

1

within that original criteria, and second,· the plaintiffs were subjected to
"discriminatory and oppressive conduct by a powerful labor organizatior. ,
which was required, as bargaining agent, to protect their individual
interests."

186 F. 2d at 481.

The court cited therein authority supportr:

the power of equity to award attorney's fees.

Obviously, this is not a

suit in equity.
The case of Rainev v. Jackson State College, 481 F. 2d 347 (5th C
1973), again illustrates an unusual situation where attorney's fees could
be awarded in which it was totally unllke the instant case.

Raine,Y was'

civil rights action arising out of an employment contract and the courc:
sustained a partial award of attorney's fees due
openly violated a previous court order.

to

the fact that de:er.LC

The standards set :·orth

tl;erc
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was that in carrying out the litigation, defendants must be "unreasonable
and obdurately obstinate".

Similarly, the case of Monroe v. Board of

Commissioners of the City of Jackson, Tennessee, 453 F. 2d 259 (6th
Cir. 1972), was a civil rights suit under a school desegregation plan.
Again, defendants were guilty at one point of violating a clear court
mandate.

The court allowed award of attorney's fees for litigation arising

from that act. Attorney's fees were not allowed for the entire litigation,
however, due to the fact that it was normal litigation and defendant was
not guilty of unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy.

Also, the court was

obliged to follow the determination of the district court.

They stated:

As noted in the Bradley case, the question of whether
the defendant has been guilty of unreasonable, obdurate
ob::tinacy is for the district judge to determine. He has
a wide discretion in this regard, . . . 453 F. 2d at
2 63.
It may be true that "a common carrier has a duty to carry all

passengers upon reasonable request" but this duty does not run in
contravention of the regulations promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics
Board.

It cannot be contended that the common law doctrine surrounding

common carriers would require Capitol to provide air carrier service
to DeEry in violation of the CAB regulations.

Exhaustive treatment of

DeEry's inappropriate conduct and Capitol's refusal to provide the
service has been given herein and the discussion need not be prolonged
at this point.
DeEry contends that Capitol unfairly prolonged and delayed the
--1Stant lit 1 gation.

It was DeEry's contention that Capitol was a common
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carrier and Capitol denied this status.

DeEry contends that this was ar.

unreasonable contention but this may be answered simply by referring
to the trial transcript.

During argument to the court on this point and

others, the court stated:
You are both very persuasive. lam going to give the
matter consideration and we will go on with the evidence
this afternoon. (Tr. Day 3, p. 47)
Obviously the lower court did not feel there was no reasonable basis
for this theory, and, in fact, the theory contended for by DeEry was
not stipulated to.

Capitol stipulated that it was a "common carrier with

the framework of the Civil Aeronautics Board's regulations . . . " (Tr.
Day 3, p. 47).

There was no stipulation of common carrier status unde

common law and counsel entered into the stipulation solely for the purpc

of simplification of that issue due to the fact that common carrier statuo
under the CAB regulations would not change any of the liabilities of
Capitol.

To deny the good faith of counsel without more substantial corr

plaints than this would be to incorrectly apply the law.
DeEry contends that Capitol's in-house counsel, Mr. Topharn
purposefully deceived or attempted to deceive DeEry.

However, this w

explained by Mr. Mansfield at trial where he told the court that he infor
Mr. Topham that contracts had been sent to Topham's office and that
Topham's inability to find the contract forms could have been due to
sloppy housekeeping.

(Tr. Day 3, pp. 17 through 19).

Clearly, tho.l

contention was not met by DeEry's ev1dence and there is nu reason
doubt Mr. Mansfield's credibility.
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Again, this is not a case in equity but a contract case regarding
damages and the general rule does not allow attorney's fees.

The "bad

faith" cited by DeEry is little more than run of the mill litigation.

If

one wishes to discuss bad faith of one of the parties, one need only
consider the fact that this is the third lawsuit instituted by DeEry against
Capitol and the only one in which DeEry was successful.
p. 19).

(Tr. Day 2,

One of those actions was filed in the Federal District Court

and another was tried in the Third District Court of Utah and heard by
the Utah Supreme Court.
DeEry.

Both of these cases were decided against

When the facts of this litigation were brought up at trial, DeEry

continually denied that the decisions in these cases went against him.
(Tr. Day 2, p. 2 0, 21).

A more clear example of bad faith would be

difficult to imagine by the court.

However, even this may not arise to

the level of bad faith required for an award of attorney's fees.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court with
regard to the award of attorney's fees should stand .. This is a matter
which is within the discretion of the trial judge and no compelling reasons
for the award can be cited in this case.
CONCLUSION
1.

Capitol is controlled extensively by the Civil Aeronautics

Board, and, therefore, all contracts entered into by Capitol with tour
operators are with knowledge of the regulations and requirements of
·d:e CAB.
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2.

DeEry is an experienced tour operator and must be presumec

to have knowledge and understanding of the CAB regulations and requirements, and, therefore, enters into contracts with air carriers with that
knowledge.

It was understood by both parties that compliance with C1B

regulations was necessary to have a binding contract.
3.

The evidence clearly sets out that the parties on both sides

considered the contract forms to be a tentative agreement subJect to
modification by both parties and subJect to compliance with the conditic:;;
of the contract itself.

The circumstances show the intent of the parties

to be less than that required for a contract.

For the foregoing reasons

Capitol requests that this court reverse the decree below and order a
decree in favor of Capitol, finding that there was no contract.
4.

If this court finds a contract, it must also find from the

circumstances that DeEry breached the conditions of that contract, there:
excusing Capitol from performance.

Therefore, Capitol requests that

t:.

court reverse the decree below and order a decree in favor of Capitol,
finding that there was no duty on the part of Capitol to perform.
5.

If this court finds that Capitol had a duty to perform ur.der

the contract and breached that duty, it should also find that by failing to
act until it was effectively too late, De Bry failed in mitigating its damagt
Had DeEry acted when a reasonable man would be expected to do so,

rhC

may have been no damages, and in any case, no more than the maxine:-·
as decided upon by the JUry below.

Therefore, Capitol requests thts
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to modify the damage decree below to reflect the fact that DeEry failed
in his responsibility. Thus,

no damages should be awarded.

Otherwi.se,

the decree should not be disturbed.
Respectfully submitted this ___ day of October, 1977.
STRONG & HANNI
By________________________________
PHILIP R. FISHLER
Attorneys for Respondent
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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